idea that theories purport to describe the world as it is in its unobservable parts-a central realist intuition about science-would become a non-starter. The argument was based on a theorem proved by logician William Craig, the philosophical application of which led to the statement that came to be known as Craig's Theorem: for any scientific theory T, T is replaceable by another (axiomatisable) theory Craig(T) , consisting of all and only the theorems of T which are formulated in terms of the observational vocabulary V O (Craig 1956 ). The gist of Craig's theorem is that a theory is a conservative extension of the deductive systematization of its observational consequences. This theorem was taken to capture the canonical form of instrumentalism.
Though it's hard to find philosophers who explicitly characterized themselves as instrumentalists, 2 Graig's theorem offered a boost to instrumentalism-the view that theories should be seen as (useful) instruments for the organization, classification and prediction of observable phenomena; hence that the 'cash value' of scientific theories is fully captured by what theories say about the observable world. Craig's theorem was taken to show that the whole body of theoretical commitments in science-those expressed by the theoretical vocabulary-were dispensable, since theoretical terms could be eliminated en bloc, without loss in the deductive connections among the observable consequences of the theory.
At roughly the same time, Carnap (1958) re-invented the so-called Ramseysentence. The idea goes back to Frank Ramsey (1929) : the content of a theory is captured by a single existential statement, in which the theoretical predicates are replaced by bound (second-order existential) quantifiers. The Ramsey-sentence R T that replaces theory T has exactly the same observational consequences as T; it can play the same role as T in reasoning; it is truth-evaluable if there are entities that satisfy it; but since it dispenses altogether with theoretical vocabulary and refers to whatever entities satisfy it only by means of quantifiers, it was taken to remove the issue of the reference of theoretical terms/predicates. Hence, it was taken to present a neutral ground between realism and instrumentalism. Carnap enthusiastically jumped on this idea since he thought he could deflate the debate between realism and 2 A notable exception is Philipp Frank (1932) , whose instrumentalism, in modern terminology, is a form of non-cognitivism: theories are symbolic tools that do not (aim to) represent anything which is not antecedently given in experience.
Against instrumentalism
In his writings in the 1960s, Putnam aimed to motivate and defend realism first by arguing systematically against instrumentalist approaches to scientific theories.
Two of his arguments stick out. The first relates to Craig's Theorem-based instrumentalism. Putnam (1965) mounted a formidable attack on the philosophical significance of Craig's theorem arguing that a) theoretical terms are meaningful, taking their meaning from the theories in which they feature and b) scientists employ terms like 'electron', 'virus', 'spacetime curvature' and so on-and advance relevant theories-because they wish to talk about electrons, viruses, the curvature of spacetime and so on; that is scientists want to find out about the unobservable world.
Theoretical terms provide scientists with the necessary linguistic tools for talking about things they want to talk about. 1970s (1973; 1974; 1975a) , he extended this theory to cover the reference of natural-kind terms, physical-magnitude terms and theoretical terms.
A key consequence of this causal theory is that semantic incommensurability is disposed of and the possibility of referential continuity in theory-change is safeguarded. If, for instance, the referent of the term 'electricity' is fixed causally, all different theories of electricity refer to, and dispute over, the same 'existentially given' magnitude, viz. electricity. The causal theory makes available a way to compare theories and to allow claims to the effect that the successor theory is more truthlike than its predecessors. Besides, it tallied with Putnam's considered view that the positive defense of realism is, by and large, an empirical (naturalistic) endeavour.
The way the world is constituted and causally interacts with the language-users is an indispensable constraint on the theory and practice of fixing the reference (and meaning) of the language used to talk about the world: the conceptual and linguistic categories scientists use to talk about the world are tuned to accommodate the causal structure of the world.
Given these of arguments, the negative case for scientific realism-viz., that instrumentalism fails patently to account for the role, scope and aim of scientific theories-was hard to resist.
For Realism
Putnam went further by offering a positive argument for scientific realism. In his (1975: 73) he penned the most famous argument for scientific realism-which has become known as the 'no miracles argument' (NMA). Here is the argument in full:
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle. That terms in mature scientific theories typically refer (this formulation is due REFERENCE implies that (an essential part of) the subject matter of science is the unobservable world. By the same token, however, the metaphysical dimension of scientific realism is captured by not (much) more than the assertion that theoretical entities are real (viz., that theoretical terms genuinely refer).
TRUTH takes realism beyond REFERENCE in asserting that t-entities (at least those referred to by t-terms featuring in true theories) are real: they populate the world. For both Boyd (1971; 1981) and (the 1970s) Putnam, TRUTH implies a certain understanding of truth, viz., truth as correspondence: to say that a theory is true is to say that it corresponds to reality. The chief motivation for such a conception of truth was explanationist. Putnam and Boyd insisted that truth (and reference) plays a key explanatory role: it explains the success of action (more particularly, the success of scientific theories and methodology, in the case of science).
That truth has an explanatory function in science is the key idea behind the 'no miracles' argument. To be sure, it is approximate truth that at best can be attributed to scientific theories. 3 But the logical point behind the 'no miracles argument' is that the success of scientific methodology is best explained by the fact that the theories that indispensably inform this methodology are relevantly true-that is true in the respects that inform the employment of these methodologies. Some philosophers (e.g., Ghins
2001) have argued that it is not the truth of theory X that explains its empirical success, but the fact that entities and properties posited by X are real. True enough! Yet all that is required to move from reality to truth is semantic ascent.
TRUTH has notable metaphysical implications, viz., that scientific theories are answerable to the world and are made true by the world. The most congenial to realism way to develop this insight is by what I have come to call THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVERGENCE. The notion of correspondence is meant to capture the asymmetric dependence of the theories on the world. This asymmetry implies that though empirical success (even empirical adequacy) is a sign of truth, when truth is attributed to the theory, this is a substantive attribution which is meant to imply that the theory is made true by the world; which, in its turn, is taken to imply that it is logically possible that an accepted, successful and well-confirmed theory might be false simply because the world might not conform to it. This POSSIBILITY OF DIVERGENCE is meant to capture a modal fact of the world and in particular a sense in which the world is independent of theories, beliefs, warrants, epistemic practices etc. It requires a conception of truth which distances truth from certain epistemic notions (even idealized ones) such as being ideally warrantedly assertible. Hence, TRUTH implies that realism is committed to a non-epistemic conception of truth.
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Taken together REFERENCE and TRUTH imply a certain way to view the metaphysics of scientific realism. It's not enough for realism to argue that certain theoretical entities posited by scientific theories are real. They and their properties should be (part of) the truth-makers of theoretical assertions and they should be mindindependent (in the way suggested by THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVERGENCE).
CONTINUITY takes scientific realism beyond REFERENCE and TRUTH by capturing the all-important notion of convergence in theory-change. This kind of thesis is necessary for convergence, since it secures that successor theories might well talk about the very same entities that their abandoned predecessors did, even though the now abandoned theories might have mischaracterized these entities. Putnam thought that the failure of CONTINUITY would lead to a disastrous "metainduction":
just as no term used in the science of more than fifty (or whatever) years ago referred, so it will turn out that no term used now (except may be observational terms, if there any such) refers (1978, 25) .
Then, REFERENCE and TRUTH go by the board too.
Putnam took it, correctly and insightfully I think, that this kind of pessimistic argument calls for a distinctively philosophical answer, viz. a theory of reference which allows for referential continuity on theory-change. So the key point is not that the premise of the inductive argument is false. Rather it is that this kind of argument relies on the implicit assumption that there is radical reference variance in theory change; that is that, a t-term that features in different theories necessarily refers to distinct unobservable entities. So Putnam's diagnosis was that the historical challenge to realism he envisaged was a golden opportunity to articulate realism in a better way:
realism should avoid some descriptivist and holistic theory of reference. For it is only on such a theory of reference that, as we have already noted in section 3, it becomes inevitable that that every time the theory changes, the meanings of all terms change, too; and given that reference is supposed to be fixed by descriptions, meaning change is taken to lead reference variance. It transpires then, that adopting a theory of reference, such as the causal theory, which allows for referential stability in theorychange is indispensable for CONTINUITY and scientific realism. 6. Looking for a role for history
The principle of no privilege
Things did not turn out to be very easy for realism. If realism is an historical thesis, the history of science should be called in to support it or undermine it. In her (1976) , Hesse advanced what she called "a principle of no privilege," according to which our own scientific theories are held to be as much subject to radical conceptual change as past theories are seen to be. Hesse (1976: 266) put forward an argument that all theories are false.
Every scientific system implies a conceptual classification of the world into an ontology of fundamental entities and properties -it is an attempt to answer the question "What is the world really made of?" But it is exactly these ontologies that are most subject to radical change throughout the history of science. Therefore in the spirit of the principle of no privilege, it seems that we must say either that all these ontologies are true, ie: we must give a realistic interpretation of all of them or we must say they are all false. But they cannot all be true in the same world, because they contain conflicting answers to the question 'What is the world made of?' Therefore they must all be false.
This argument, it should be clear, implies a substantial role for history of science.
For unless there is a recognizable pattern of change in the 'ontology of fundamental entities and properties', it can always be argued that our current scientific theories are not subject to radical change. The rationale for the Principle of No Privilege is predominantly historical and hence its defense should be historical. As Hesse admitted, the Principle arises "from accepting the induction from the history of science" (1976: 271).
But this is precisely the problem with this Principle: it should be borne out by the history of theory-change in science that all these 'ontologies' have been incompatible with each other; hence they cannot all be true. Showing incompatibility presupposes a theory of reference of t-terms which does not allow that same or different terms featuring in different theories can nonetheless refer to the same entity in the world.
And this is precisely the position already challenged by Putnam: it is simply questionbegging to adopt a theory of reference which makes it inevitable that there is radicalreference variance in theory-change. 6 Hesse, like almost everyone else at that time, made a connection between reference and ontology in that the ontological commitments of the theory are reflected in the (putative) reference of its theoretical terms. Hence, whether or not there is continuity in ontology among successive theories was taken to be the same as the existence or not of referential continuity. In her argument, Hesse relied precisely on the possibility, "emphasized by revolutionaries," that, as she put it "all our theoretical terms will, in the natural course of scientific development, share the demise of phlogiston" (1976: 271).
To be sure, Hesse, like almost anyone else in this debate, shares the intuition that falsity cannot genuinely explain the successes of science. Hence she goes on to argue that there is some continuity in theory-change which is not restricted to the "accumulation of true observation sentences," but includes some theoretical sentences which are carried over fairly directly from a past theoretical framework to our own, that is, which do not depend for their truth on the existence and classification of particular hypothetical entities, but are nearer to pragmatic predictive test.
Interestingly, these statements include that "water is composed of discrete molecules of hydrogen and oxygen in definite proportions." This, she says, "is true, though we are not able to specify in ultimate terms what exactly molecules and atoms of water, hydrogen, and oxygen are (Newtonian, Daltonian, quantum, and relativistic field theories tell different stories about them)."
The issue then is this. Is there a sense in which "the revolutionary induction from the history of science about theory change" (Hesse 1976: 268) can be blocked by admitting that the continuity in theory change is substantial? Differently put, Hesse's argument says nothing about false theories being such that some of them are truer (in their theoretical assertions) than others. And this is precisely the option realists came to exploit.
Getting nearer to the truth
William Newton-Smith (1981) was perhaps the first to think that the history of science (better: the past track-record of science) could be used in defence of realism.
He took realism to be committed to two theses
(1) theories are true or false in virtue of how the world is, and (2) the point of the scientific enterprise is to discover explanatory truths about the world.
He then noted that (2) is under threat "if we reflect on the fact that all physical theories in the past have had their heyday and have eventually been rejected as false."
And he added (ibid):
Indeed, there is inductive support for a pessimistic induction: any theory will be discovered to be false within, say 200 years of being propounded. We may think of some of our current theories as being true. But modesty requires us to assume that they are not so. For what is so special about the present? We have good inductive grounds for concluding that current theories-even our most favorite ones-will come to be seen to be false. Indeed the evidence might even be held to support the conclusion that no theory that will ever be discovered by the human race is strictly speaking true. So how can it be rational to pursue that which we have evidence for thinking can never be reached?
It should be obvious that part of the argument that Newton-Smith aimed to neutralize advanced what he called a transcendental strategy in its defense, which, for all practical purposes I think, is a 'best explanation' strategy. The key argument was that there is an "undeniable fact" to be reckoned with, viz., that "in a mature science like physics, contemporary theories provided us with better predictions about the world than their predecessors and have placed us in a better position to manipulate that world." The reckoning came with the claim that if the 'greater verisimilitude' thesis is correct (that is, if theories "are increasing in truth-content without increasing in falsity-content"), then the increase in predictive power would be explained and be rendered expectable. This increase in predictive power "would be totally mystifying (…) if it were not for the fact that theories are capturing more and more truth about the world."
This kind of argument, plausible though it may be, dismisses the force of the pessimistic induction all too quickly. Not because Newton-Smith is wrong about the need to focus on near or approximate truth rather than on (full and exact) truth. But because the pessimistic induction, if forceful at all, undercuts the explanatory link between success and approximate truth. Hence the realists needed to do some more work to restore this link.
A confutation of convergent realism
That more work was needed became obvious after the publication of Laudan's (1981).
His history-based argument against realism was precisely meant to show how the link between success and truth is undermined by taking into account the history of science.
Laudan formulated his argument via reference-a point alluded to in Putnam's formulation of realism. But he did aim to block the claim that there is an explanatory connection between (approximate) truth and success-a point raised by NewtonSmith's argument.
Laudan started with granting, "for the sake of argument" that if a theory is approximately true, then it will be successful. He then aimed to show that even if we granted this, "explanatory success" cannot be taken "as a rational warrant for a judgment of approximate truth." So his aim was to show that the realist thesis is not rationally warranted.
What is the structure of Laudan's argument? There is some controversy concerning this issue, but the thought has been that if we are to take seriously Laudan's "plethora" of theories that were "both successful and (so far as we can judge) nonreferential with respect to many of their central explanatory concepts", then the argument is inductive. In particular:
There is a plethora of theories (ratio 6 to 1) 7 which were successful and yet not approximately true.
Therefore, it is highly probable that current theories will not be approximately true (despite their success).
Yet, this kind of argument has obvious flaws. Two are the most important, I think.
The first is that the basis for induction is hard to assess. This does not just concern the 6:1 ratio-where does it come from? It also concerns the issue of how we individuate and count theories as well as how we judge success and referential failure. Unless we are clear on all these issues in advance of the inductive argument, we cannot even start putting together the inductive evidence for its conclusion.
The second flaw of (I) is that the conclusion is too strong. It does not just undercut the connection between success and approximate truth; it yields as a conclusion that it is more likely than not that current successful theories are not approximately true.
Hence it makes it the case that there is rational warrant for the judgment that current theories are not approximately true. The flaw with this kind a of sweeping generalisation is precisely that it disregards totally the strong evidence there is for current theories-it renders it totally irrelevant to the issue of their likelihood of being true. Surely this is unwarranted. Not only because it disregards potentially important differences in the quality and quantity of evidence there is for current theories (differences that would justify treating current theories as more supported by available evidence than past theories were by the then available evidence); but also because it 
The divide et impera strategy
If we think of Laudan's argument as a warrant-remover argument and if we also think that the fate of (past) theories should have a bearing on what we are warranted
in accepting now, we should think differently. In my (1996; 1999 chapter 5) I argued that we should think of Laudan's argument as a kind of reductio. And by this, (somewhat confusingly I must now admit), I meant to imply that it is not a proper reductio. As I noted, Laudan's argument aimed to "discredit the claim that there is an explanatory connection between empirical success and truth-likeness" which would warrant the realist view that current successful theories are approximately true. If we view the argument this way, as a potential warrant-remover argument, then the past record of science does play a role in it, since it is meant to offer this warrant-remover.
But Laudan was careful to be using the qualifier "so far as we can judge" repeatedly.
Past theories are non-referential "so far as we can judge," that is by our own lights.
This implied that past theories were false, "so far as we can judge." This means that if we accept current theories to be true, then "so far as we can judge" past theories cannot be true. All this is consistent with leaving it open that current theories are true or false. It just requires that it cannot be the case that both past theories and current ones are true.
So my (1996) reconstruction of Laudan's argument was as follows: (B) is critical for the argument. It is meant to capture discontinuity in theory-change, which I put it thus (stated in the material mode): "Past theories are deemed not to have been truth-like because the entities they posited are no longer believed to exist and/or because the laws and mechanisms they postulated are not part of our current theoretical description of the world."
In this setting, Laudan's 'historical gambit' (C) makes perfect sense. For unless there are past successful theories which are warrantedly deemed not to be truth-like "so far as we can judge," the previous premise cannot be sustained and the warrantremoving reductio fails. If premise (C) can be substantiated, success cannot be used to warrant the claim that current theories are true. And there is no way that this premise can be substantiated apart from looking at past successful theories and their fate.
History of science is thereby essentially engaged.
I still think this is the best way to make sense of the challenge Laudan had in mind in a way that a) the fate of past theories is seriously taken into account and b) the argument is seen as warrant-removing. To respond then to this argument, realists needed to be selective in their commitments. This response has come to be known as the divide et impera strategy to refute Laudan's argument (see my 1996). The focus of this strategy was on rebutting the claim that the truth of current theories implies that past theories cannot be deemed truth-like.
Philip Kitcher (1993) and myself (1996; 1999) have argued that there are ways to distinguish between the 'good' and the 'bad' parts of past abandoned theories and to show that the 'good' parts-those that enjoyed evidential support, were not idle components and the like-were retained in subsequent theories. This kind of response suggests that there has been enough theoretical continuity in theory-change to warrant the realist claim that science is 'on the right track'. To be more precise, the realist strategy proceeds in two steps. The first is to make the claim of continuity (or convergence) plausible, viz., to show that there is continuity in theory-change and that this is not merely empirical continuity: substantive theoretical claims that featured in past theories and played a key role in their successes (especially novel predictions) have been incorporated in subsequent theories and continue to play an important role in making them empirically successful. But this first step does not establish that the convergence is to the truth. For this claim to be made plausible a second argument is needed, viz., that the emergence of this evolving-but-convergent network of theoretical assertions is best explained by the assumption that it is, by and large, approximately true. 8
Structural Realism
The selective realist trend started with the position that John Worrall (1989) dubbed 'structural realism'. This was an attempt to capitalize on the fact that despite the radical changes at the theoretical level, successor theories have tended to retain the mathematical structure of their predecessors. Worrall's thought was that theories can successfully represent the structure of the world, although they tend to be wrong in their claims about the entities they posit. As Worrall put it: the structural realist "insists that it is a mistake to think that we can ever 'understand' the nature of the basic furniture of the universe " (1989: 122) . Then, in opposition to scientific realism, structural realism restricts the cognitive content of scientific theories to their mathematical structure together with their empirical consequences. But, in opposition to instrumentalism, structural realism suggests that the mathematical structure of a theory represents the structure of the world (real relations between things).
Unsurprisingly, the chief argument for structural realism is a (weak) version of the 'no miracles' argument. The key idea is that though successful novel predictions suggest that the theory has latched onto the world, it is only the structure of the world (as this is expressed by the mathematical structure of the theory) that the theory latches onto. Against the pessimistic induction, structural realism contends that there is continuity in theory-change, but this continuity is (again) at the level of mathematical structure. Hence, the 'carried over' mathematical structure of the theory correctly represents the structure of the world and this best explains the predictive success of a theory. Now, if this kind of argument is to lend any credence to structural realism, it must be the case that the mathematical structure of a theory is somehow exclusively responsible for the predictive success of the theory. But, as I have argued in detail in my (1995), it is not true that the mathematical equations alone-devoid of their physical content-can give rise to any predictions.
If structural realism is to employ a version (no matter how weak) of the nomiracles argument in order to claim that retained mathematical equations reveal real relations in the world, it should also admit that some physical content-not necessarily empirical and low-level-is also retained. But such an admission would undercut the claim that the predictive success vindicates only the mathematical structure of a theory; by the same token, it would undercut the epistemic dichotomy between the structure and the content of a physical theory.
Structural realism was independently developed in the 1970s by Grover Maxwell (1970; 1970a) in an attempt to show that the Ramsey-sentence approach to theories need not lead to instrumentalism. He called 'Structural realism' the view that: i) scientific theories issue in existential commitments to unobservable entities and ii) all non-observational knowledge of unobservables is structural knowledge, i.e.,
knowledge not of their first-order (or intrinsic) properties, but rather of their higherorder (or structural) properties. The key idea here was that a Ramsey-sentence satisfies both conditions (i) and (ii). So we might say that, if true, the Ramseysentence R T gives us knowledge of the structure of the world: there is a certain structure which satisfies the Ramsey-sentence and the structure of the world (or of the relevant worldly domain) is isomorphic to this structure. It should be noted that
Maxwell's point against Carnap was that the Ramsey-sentence approach to theories was amenable to a realist construal more than to an instrumentalist one. This is a pretty damaging objection to structural realism. The only way out is for structural realism to abandon pure structuralism and to treat structure as being defined by real or natural relations. Having first specified these natural relations, one may abstract away their content and study their structure. But if one begins with the structure, then one is in no position to tell which relations one studies and whether they are natural or not. 
Concluding thoughts
Four decades after the 'no miracles argument' and the 'pessimistic induction', where does the realism debate stand? It seems fair to say that a key realist claim, viz., that science does offer knowledge of the unobservable part of nature, has been vindicated.
Currently, all sides of the debate-with the exception of constructive empiricismadmit that science does offer epistemic access to some unobservable parts of reality.
Hence, the unobservable is not, ipso facto, epistemically inaccessible. Old empiricism-motivated claims that scientific knowledge is restricted to whatever is 10 For more on this see my (1999; 2001 & 2006) . See also Demopoulos (2003) . given in immediate experience and observation hold no weight any more.
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By the same token, however, the rivalry to scientific realism has now shifted to the general point that there is a sharp epistemic division to be drawn within the unobservable; that is, between those aspects of the unobservable that are epistemically accessible and those that are not. Structural realists, for instance, draw the division between the knowable (unobservable) structure of nature and whatever is left to 'fill in' the structure-objects, entities, natures and the like. Contextual instrumentalists (Stanford 2006) draw the division between those entities to which there is an independent route of epistemic access (mediated by theories that cannot be subjected to serious doubt) and those entities to which all supposed epistemic access is mediated by high-level theories. The former are epistemically accessible, while the latter are said to be impenetrable. Semi-realists (cf. Chakravartty 2007) draw the division between detection properties and auxiliary properties of particulars; and so on.
The common denominator of all these dichotomous positions is this: there is a principled limit to the scientific knowledge of the world. (The limit is different in different positions, but it is always principled and definite). The realist victory is that this division is within the realm of the unobservable. But the realist defeat is that some aspect of the unobservable is, for principled reasons, inaccessible.
In my own work I have tried to argue that there is no good reason (either a priori or a posteriori) to think that there is a principled epistemic division between what can be known of nature and what cannot. There might be parts of nature that science might never be able to map out, but these do not fall nicely within a conceptual category which captures one side of a sharp epistemic dichotomy (the unknown X: the noumena; the non-structure; the intrinsic properties; the auxiliary properties;
whatever-there-is-only-thin-epistemic access-to; whatever-there-is-only-theorymediated-access-to; and the like).
Though the epistemic debate still goes on, the focus of attention has been shifting from epistemology towards metaphysics and ontology. The key question seems to be the following: if we take science seriously and if we take scientific theories as true, or approximately true, are we thereby committed to a certain way to understand the deep structure of the world? Are we committed to substantive accounts of causation, laws, necessity, properties and other key metaphysical categories? Or are deflationary accounts good enough? As I have put it in my (2013), the key contrast is between a neo-Aristotelian scientific realism and a neo-Humean one. I have personally sided with the neo-Humeans, but currently lots of interesting work is done on this front. The current enthusiasm for structuralism is a case in point.
